Workin’ 9:00–5:00 For Nine Months: Assessing Pregnancy Discrimination Laws in Georgia by Pettet, Kaitlyn
Georgia State University Law Review
Volume 33
Issue 3 Spring 2017 Article 5
5-24-2017
Workin’ 9:00–5:00 For Nine Months: Assessing
Pregnancy Discrimination Laws in Georgia
Kaitlyn Pettet
Georgia State University College of Law, kepettet22@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Civil Law Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination
Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Family Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment
Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, Law and
Economics Commons, Law and Gender Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Social Welfare Law
Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia State
University Law Review by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kaitlyn Pettet, Workin’ 9:00–5:00 For Nine Months: Assessing Pregnancy Discrimination Laws in Georgia, 33 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 771
(2017).
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol33/iss3/5
 771
WORKIN’ 9:00–5:00 FOR NINE MONTHS: 
ASSESSING PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION 
LAWS IN GEORGIA 
Kaitlyn Pettet* 
INTRODUCTION 
Kimberly Troupe worked at a Lord & Taylor department store as a 
saleswoman where her work was deemed entirely satisfactory.1 She 
became pregnant and started experiencing morning sickness, which 
resulted in her tardiness to work.2 In a period of one month, she was 
either late to work or left work early on nine out of twenty-one 
working days.3 The next month she arrived late on three consecutive 
days. 4  After receiving a warning from her supervisor, Troupe 
continued to arrive late due to her pregnancy symptoms and was soon 
after fired. 5  Troupe then filed a lawsuit claiming wrongful 
termination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.6 The Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals sided with Lord & Taylor, however, and 
upheld the termination.7 
                                                                                                                 
*J.D. Candidate 2017, Georgia State University. First, thank you to Jenna Rubin for the constant support 
and encouragement. Her mentorship made this Note possible. Thanks also to my Law Review editing 
group for the hard work and laughs. Finally, thanks to Sheryl and the team for the outpouring of love, 
patience, and support during law school. 
 1. Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co. (Troupe II), 20 F.3d 734, 735 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 2. Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co. (Troupe I), No. 92 C 2605, 1993 WL 191792, at *1 (N.D. Il. 
June 4,1993). Because of her morning sickness, Troupe was placed on an afternoon schedule where she 
would work from 12:00 P.M. to 5:00 P.M. Id. In a fifteen-day period, however, Troupe reported to work 
late seven times ranging from ten minutes to one hour. Id. After a verbal warning from her supervisor, 
Troupe reported to work fifteen minutes late to work and was given a written warning. Id. Her tardiness 
improved after the written warning, but then over a three-day period she was again reporting late to 
work. Id. She was then placed on a sixty-day probationary period and was told that any further tardiness 
would result in her dismissal. Id. During the probationary period, Troupe was again late eleven times 
and, as a result, was dismissed. Troupe, 1993 WL 191792, at *1. 
 3. Troupe II, 20 F.3d at 735. 
 4. Id. (Troupe received both verbal and written warnings from her supervisor). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 734. The court reflected that “[w]e do not know whether Lord & Taylor was less tolerant 
of Troupe’s tardiness than it would have been had the cause not been a medical condition related to 
pregnancy. There is no evidence on this question, vital as it is.” Id. at 736. 
 7. Id. at 738 (finding the plaintiff “ha[d] no evidence from which a rational trier of fact could infer 
that she was a victim of pregnancy discrimination”). The District Court found in favor of May 
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Debrah Rhett worked for a real estate company and received a 
salary increase due to her satisfactory job performance. 8  Soon 
thereafter, she informed her supervisors and coworkers that she was 
pregnant and later left work on maternity leave.9 While on leave, the 
company faced an economic downturn and was forced to eliminate 
several positions, including Rhett’s.10 Rhett filed a lawsuit alleging 
pregnancy discrimination.11 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that the company’s actions did not violate the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act.12 
Suzanne Harvender became pregnant while working as a staff 
laboratory technician. 13  She received a note from her physician 
recommending that she should not be exposed to chemicals during 
her pregnancy for fear of harmful effects on the fetus.14 The company 
then placed Harvender on twelve weeks of Family Medical Leave 
Act (FMLA)15 leave and stipulated that if she were unable to return 
                                                                                                                 
Department Stores holding plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination and could not 
prove satisfactory job performance. See Troupe I, 1993 WL 191792, at *3. 
 8. Rhett v. Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 290, 293 (3d Cir. 1997). Carnegie initially hired Rhett 
as a temporary secretary, but, due to her work performance, granted her a full-time position and a salary 
increase of $1,500. Id. 
 9. Id. Carnegie hired a temporary secretary to fill in while Rhett was gone on maternity leave. Id. 
Carnegie also did not have a formal maternity leave policy but followed a practice of trying to hold 
employee’s jobs open for them when their maternity leave was completed. Id. If the employee contacted 
the company and something suitable was available at the time, the job would be opened to them. Id. 
 10. Rhett, 129 F.3d at 293. While Rhett was on maternity leave, the company experienced a 
significant economy downturn. Id. at 293. The company decided to make a large number of cutbacks to 
decrease costs, including the elimination of several positions. Id. Among the positions eliminated were 
that of Rhett’s supervisor and Rhett herself. Id. In a letter to Rhett, the company informed her that it did 
not consider her an employee at the time. Id. Rhett inquired about other positions with the company but 
was informed that she was not qualified for the jobs and would not be considered for them. Id. at 293–
94. 
 11. Rhett, 129 F.3d at 295 (stating “it appears that Rhett was an employee of Carnegie on an unpaid 
leave of absence who sought reinstatement. We need not, however, definitely so determine because even 
assuming that Carnegie still employed Rhett when it abolished her position . . . she is not entitled to 
relief”). 
 12. Id. at 297 (holding it is permissible for an employer to consider an employee’s absence on 
maternity leave in making adverse decisions about her employment status). 
 13. Harvender v. Norton Co. No. 96-CV-653, 1997 WL 793085 *1 (N.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 14. Id. Harvender requested assignment to the Research and Development Department for a light 
duty assignment as she had done in an earlier pregnancy. Id. Norton responded that her request could 
not be accommodated due to restructuring and downsizing. Id. 
 15. Id. The Family Medical Leave Act allows employees to take unpaid leave for specified medial 
and family reasons such as the birth of a child. 29 C.F.R. § 825.100 (2009). Employees have their jobs 
protected while on leave and must be allowed to continue their group health insurance under the same 
2
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to her job at the conclusion of the leave, the company would 
terminate her employment.16 Harvender responded by filing a lawsuit 
alleging pregnancy discrimination along with additional claims. 17 
The district court held that the company had not engaged in 
pregnancy discrimination.18 
Cases such as Kimberly Troupe’s, Debrah Rhett’s, and Suzanne 
Harvender’s demonstrate that there is still a considerable way to go 
before women are no longer forced to choose between pregnancy and 
keeping their career. Allegations of pregnancy discrimination in the 
workplace are also on the rise. 19  In 1997, 4,000 plaintiffs filed 
complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC).20 By 2011, that number rose to 5,800.21 The EEOC won 
                                                                                                                 
terms and conditions as if they had not taken leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.100. FMLA can apply to serious 
health conditions that do not allow the employee to perform essential functions of their job. 29 C.F.R. 
§ 825.100; see also Family and Medical Leave Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, (1993), https://www.dol.gov/ 
whd/fmla/. 
 16. Harvender, 1997 WL 793085 *1. 
 17. Id. Harvender also claimed knowing and intentional violation of the Family and Medical Leave 
Act and that the company acted with the intention of causing her severe emotional distress. Id. The court 
held that Harvender had failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that Norton’s behavior was extreme 
and outrageous enough to overcome a motion to dismiss. Id. at *4. On the FMLA claim, the court ruled 
that Harvender had failed to stipulate specific facts to create a genuine issue for trial. Id. at *8. Summary 
judgment was entered for Norton. Id. 
 18. Harvender, 1997 WL 793085 *8 (holding that “while it may be true that Harvender wished to 
continue working as a laboratory technician, the fact remains that she could not perform an essential 
element of that job and therefore could not perform the job satisfactorily. In short, the plaintiff’s medical 
condition prevented her from doing her job”). 
 19. Deborah Brake & Joanna Grossman, Unprotected Sex: The Pregnancy Discrimination Act at 35, 
21 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 67, 68–69 (2013); see also D’Andra Millsap, Reasonable 
Accommodation of Pregnancy in the Workplace: A Proposal to Amend the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 1411, 1413 (1996); Daniela de la Piedra, Flirting with the PDA: Congress Must 
Give Birth to Accommodation Rights that Protect Pregnant Working Women, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & 
L. 275, 276 (2008); Eliza Simon, Parity by Comparison: The Case for Comparing Pregnant and 
Disabled Workers, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 254, 260 (2015); Joan Williams & Elizabeth Westfall, 
Deconstructing the Maternal Wall: Strategies for Vindicating the Civil Rights of “Careers” in the 
Workplace, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 31, 31–32 (2006). 
 20. Claire Gordon, How Employers Get Away with Firing Pregnant Women – Legally, AOL, 
http://jobs.aol.cocm;articles2012/04/05/epidemic-of-pregnant-women-getting-fired-legal-loopholes-to-
bla/20197174/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2015). The EEOC handles claims of employment discrimination on 
basis of race, color, religion, sex—including pregnancy, national origin, age, disability, or genetic 
information. Filing A Charge of Discrimination, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/charge.cfm 
(last visited Oct. 7, 2015). The EEOC is responsible for enforcement of the federal statutes related to 
discrimination. Id. All the laws enforced by the EEOC require a filing of a Charge of Discrimination 
before a person can file a job discrimination lawsuit against an employer. Id. 
 21. Gordon, supra note 20. 
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significant damages in pregnancy discrimination cases, 
demonstrating a greater tendency towards discrimination in the 
workplace.22 Additionally, this rise in claims and awards caught the 
attention of the nation’s media, placing new emphasis on the 
treatment of pregnant women in the workplace.23 
Against this backdrop of continued struggles by pregnant women 
to have their rights fully acknowledged on the job, a number of states 
responded by passing employment laws that require reasonable 
accommodations for pregnant workers. 24  States such as Illinois, 
Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Louisiana, and 
Maryland shifted in the direction of recognizing reasonable 
accommodations in the workplace similar to workers with disabilities 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).25 In fact, some 
critics have gone so far as to argue that the ADA should be modified 
to include pregnancy on its list of protected categories.26 Most other 
states have thus far resisted this trend, however, and continue only to 
provide protections that are contained in federal law.27 
This note will examine the history of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act (PDA) and some of the relevant case law that 
informs its application, while arguing that the state of Georgia should 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Brake & Grossman, supra note 19, at 69. The EEOC has obtained monetary benefits in the 
amounts of $30 million in 2007, $12.2 million in 2008, $16.8 million in 2009, $18 million in 2010, and 
$17.2 million in 2011. Pregnancy Discrimination Charges, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/ 
enforcement/pregnancy.cfm (last visited Oct. 14, 2015). 
 23. Brake & Grossman, supra note 19, at 69. 
 24. See, e.g., HAW. CODE R. § 12-46-107 (1990); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:341–342 (1997); 775 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-102(I)–(J) (West 2015); ALASKA STAT. § 39.20.500(a) (2013); CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 12945 (1)-(2) (West 2012); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit.19 § 711 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§§ 46a-60(a)(7)(B)–(G) (2011); MD. CODE. ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-606 (West 2013); W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 5-11B-2 (West 2014); MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 (2015); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 10:5-12(s) (2014). 
 25. Tanya Marcum & Sandra Perry, It Doesn’t Work At Work: Pregnancy Discrimination in the 
Workplace, 66 LAB. L.J. WL 3538782 (2015). 
 26. Brake & Grossman, supra note 19, at 122–23; see also Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as ‘Disability’ 
and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 53 B.C. L. REV. 443, 485–86 (2012); Simon, supra 
note 19, at 272; Amanda Wachuta, The ADA Gets Even More Complicated: Analyzing Pregnancy with 
Complications As A Disability, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 471, 482 (2004); Joan Williams, Robin Devaux, 
Danielle Fuschetti, & Carolyn Salmon, A Sip of Cool Water: Pregnancy Accommodation After the ADA 
Amendments Act, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 111 (2013); see generally Deborah Calloway, 
Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25 STETSON L. REV. 1 (1995); Marjorie Jacobson, 
Pregnancy and Employment: Three Approaches to Equal Opportunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1019 (1988). 
 27. See generally Marcum & Perry, supra note 25. 
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adopt legislation that strengthens protections for pregnant women in 
the workplace.28 The note will then analyze the Supreme Court’s 
recent ruling in Young v. United Parcel Service and discuss the 
manner in which the decision will impact future jurisprudence 
concerning the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.29 Finally, the note will 
examine the state of pregnancy discrimination law in Georgia and 
how Georgia has dealt with the question of pregnancy existing as a 
disability requiring reasonable accommodations from employers. 
Currently, Georgia does not provide additional protections 
supplementing federal law against pregnancy discrimination and does 
not require accommodations beyond what is required by federal 
law. 30  Accordingly, the note will propose statutory changes that 
Georgia should make to its existing employment laws to provide 
greater protections for pregnant women and to join the growing 
number of states requiring reasonable accommodations for pregnant 
women.31 
I. BACKGROUND 
In the early twentieth century, paternalistic laws intended to 
protect the health and safety of pregnant women were common.32 For 
example, an Oregon law restricted the number of hours a woman 
could work in laundries, and when challenged, the Supreme Court 
upheld the law.33 In delivering its opinion, the Court reasoned: “That 
                                                                                                                 
 28. See infra Part II. 
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. Employment Protections for Workers Who Are Pregnant or Nursing, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/wb/map/index.htm#Georgia (last visited Nov. 18, 2015). 
 31. See infra Part IV. 
 32. Brake & Grossman, supra note 19, at 72. 
[States] often relied on pregnancy-based classifications when regulating 
employment generally or setting policies for public employees . . . . Such laws 
ostensibly accommodated the domestic and reproductive obligations of women to 
protect them from exploitation by employers . . . . But this “protection” was often 
a pretext for preserving better jobs for men and did not affect all women equally. 
Working-class women and women of color . . . suffered the most from the costs 
of protection and there women received relatively few of the benefits. 
Id. 
 33. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 416–17 (1908). Oregon law stipulated that no female employer 
in any laundry facility in the state could work more than ten hours in any one day. Id. Violation of the 
law was a misdemeanor subject to a fine. Id. The defendants in the case owned a laundry and were 
5
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woman’s physical structure and the performance of maternal 
functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is 
obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood are 
upon her.” 34  In the 1940s, a government agency—the Women’s 
Bureau of the Department of Labor—recommended that pregnant 
women not be permitted to work near the date of delivery or until at 
least two months after birth.35 Several states adopted laws based on 
this recommendation.36 In the mid-twentieth century, a number of 
states banned hiring women both before and after giving birth to their 
babies to ensure that children were being properly provided for and 
reared.37 
Responding to pressure from advocates in the 1960s, the EEOC 
issued guidelines38 in 1972 holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act extended to pregnancy discrimination.39 The law developed in a 
mixed fashion, however, before the Supreme Court.40 On one hand, 
in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFluer, the Court heard a 
                                                                                                                 
charged with requiring a female employee to work more than ten hours in a day. Id. The defendants 
were brought to trial and convicted of the offense. Id. 
 34. Id. at 421. 
Even when they [women] are not [burdened by motherhood], by abundant 
testimony of the medical fraternity continuance for a long time on her feet at 
work, repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious effects upon the body, 
and, as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-
being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve 
the strength and vigor of the race. 
Muller, 208 U.S. at 421. 
 35. Women’s Bureau, Office of the Secretary, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Bulletin No. 240, Maternity 
Protection of Employed Women 7 (1952). 
 36. Marcum and Perry, supra note 25 at 12. 
 37. Deborah Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the 
Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 982 (2013). 
 38. Milestones 1972, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/milestones/1972.html (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2015). The EEOC issued guidelines on sex discrimination to prohibit employers from 
imposing mandatory leave of absences on pregnant women or firing women because they became 
pregnant. Id. The EEOC also prohibited giving pregnant women less favorable health insurance or 
disability benefits than provided to employees with other temporary medical conditions. Id. 
 39. Brake and Grossman, supra note 19, at 73. 
 40. Id. 
As bad as these decisions were for pregnant working women, the Supreme 
Court’s pregnancy jurisprudence did not foreclose all challenges to pregnancy-
based employment policies. The treatment of pregnant workers could still be 
successfully challenged if it punished women for the status of being pregnant, 
without regard to pregnancy’s actual effect on women as workers. 
Id. 
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challenge to school districts in Cleveland, Ohio requiring pregnant 
teachers to stop teaching by their fourth or fifth month of 
pregnancy. 41  The school prohibited the teacher from returning to 
teach until the next regular school semester or until the child was at 
least three months old.42 To justify this policy, the school district 
argued for the need for continuity of instruction,43 the health of the 
teacher and the unborn child, 44  and the convenience of the 
administration. 45  The Court held these practices violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.46 The Court reasoned 
that the Due Process Clause protected fundamental liberties 
pertaining to personal choices about child birth and the school district 
could not “needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously impinge upon this 
vital area of a teacher’s constitutional liberty.”47 
On the other hand, two cases before the Court demonstrated the 
limits of the EEOC guidelines.48 In Geduldig v. Aiello, the Court 
heard a challenge to a California disability insurance program that 
excluded coverage for certain disabilities related to pregnancy. 49 
Contributions from participating employees funded the program, but 
not every disabling condition was covered.50 A denial of benefits 
resulted if a participating employee was committed as an alcoholic, 
drug addict, sexual psychopath, or pregnant woman.51 In its ruling, 
the Court rejected any notion that classifications based on pregnancy 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 634 (1974). 
 42. Id. at 635. The school system also required that the teachers obtain a note from their doctor 
certifying their physical fitness and their ability to resume their teaching responsibilities. Id. 
 43. Id. at 635, 6. 
 44. Id. at 641. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 414 U.S. at 640 (stating “by acting to penalize the pregnant teacher for 
deciding to bear a child, overly restrictive maternity leave regulations can constitute a heavy burden on 
the exercise of protected freedoms”); see also Newmon v. Delta Airlines, Inc. 374 F. Supp. 238, 247 
(N.D. Ga. 1973) (holding that a company policy that required ground employees to automatically take 
maternity leave after the fifth month of pregnancy was unjustified). 
 47. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 414 U.S. at 640 (“While the regulations no doubt represent a good-faith 
attempt to achieve a laudable goal, they cannot pass muster under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, because they employ irrebuttable presumptions that unduly penalize a female 
teacher for deciding to bear a child.”). 
 48. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
 49. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 486. 
 50. Id. at 487–88. 
 51. Id. at 488–89. 
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should be subject to heightened scrutiny.52 Instead, the Court found, 
“[t]here is no risk from which men are protected and women are not. 
Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and men 
are not . . . . The program divides potential recipients into two 
groups—pregnant women and non-pregnant persons.”53 The Court 
held there was simply no connection between the “excluded 
disability and gender.”54 
In a second case before the Court, a pregnancy discrimination 
challenge under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 resulted in denial.55 In 
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, General Electric provided an 
employee benefit for non-occupational sickness to all employees but 
specifically excluded any disabilities related to the pregnancy of its 
employees.56 Several female employees whose benefit claims were 
denied filed a class action lawsuit claiming that the plan violated 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.57 The district court reasoned that 
pregnancy was neither a “disease” nor “accident,” rather it was a 
disabling condition for a period of six to eight weeks.58 The court of 
appeals affirmed the decision. 59  The Supreme Court, however, 
reversed and held that General Electric’s benefits program was not a 
form of pregnancy discrimination.60 The Court treated the exclusion 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Id. at 496–97. 
 53. Id. at 496–97, n. 20. 
Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts 
designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex of 
the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy 
from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with 
respect to any other physical condition. 
Id. 
 54. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496–97, n. 20. 
The appellee simply contends that, although she has received insurance protection 
equivalent to that provided all other participating employees, she has suffered 
discrimination because she encountered a risk that was outside the program’s 
protection. For the reasons we have stated, we hold that this contention is not a 
valid one under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Id. at 497. 
 55. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 125 (1976). 
 56. Id. at 127. 
 57. Id. at 128. 
 58. Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 377 (E.D. Va. 1974). 
 59. Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 668 (4th Cir. 1975). 
 60. Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. at 145–46. 
Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts 
8
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of pregnancy as a form of risk management in order to keep the 
insurance plan available to all employees, and thus was “not 
discrimination based on gender at all.”61 Despite the fact that only 
women can become pregnant, the Court held that pregnancy was not 
like other conditions that would typically constitute a disease or 
disability.62 
Popular reaction to the Court’s rulings in Geduldig and Gilbert 
was largely negative, with one spokesperson for a leading women’s 
rights organization denouncing the decision as a “slap in the face to 
motherhood.”63 Days after the Court handed down the decision, a 
coalition of feminists and women’s groups created the Coalition to 
End Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers, vowing to “draft 
legislation to combat the high court ruling.”64 Congress responded by 
holding hearings and then beginning work on new legislation that 
would countermand the Court’s ruling and provide new protections 
for pregnant women in the workplace.65 The product of these efforts 
would be the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.66 
Enacted as an express repudiation of the Court’s decision in 
Gilbert, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act passed by wide margins in 
both houses of Congress.67 The text of the Act amended Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to clarify that discrimination based on 
                                                                                                                 
designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or 
the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy 
from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with 
respect to any other physical condition. 
Id. at 125. 
 61. Id. at 150. “Gender-based discrimination does not result simply because an employer’s disability 
benefits plan is less than all inclusive. Petitioner’s plan is no more than an insurance package covering 
some risks but excluding others and there has been no showing that the selection of included risks 
creates a gender-based discrimination.” Id. at 126. 
 62. Id. at 136. 
 63. Nicholas Pedriana, Discrimination By Definition: The Historical and Legal Paths to the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 11 (2009). 
 64. Id. Outraged women’s groups vowed to prepare “legislation to counteract the decision and 
require that disability plans provide for the payment of wages to women out of work because of 
pregnancy.” Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 12. 
 67. Brake & Grossman, supra note 19, at 75. The bill passed in the House 376-43 and passed in the 
Senate 75-11. Id. 
9
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sex included pregnancy discrimination.68 The text of the Act stated 
“the terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are 
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions.”69 The Act went on to say that “women 
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall 
be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other 
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to 
work.”70 The Act thus categorizes pregnancy discrimination under 
Title VII’s sex discrimination language. 71  In doing so, the PDA 
renounces employment practices that force women “to choose 
between their career and family obligations.” 72  The PDA also 
embraces a basic principle that “women affected by pregnancy and 
related conditions must be treated in the same manner as other 
applicants and employees on the basis of the ability or inability to 
work.” 73  This means that “an employer will not be liable for 
dismissing a pregnant woman if she is unable to perform tasks 
intrinsic to her employment, such as lifting heavy objects or working 
overtime, unless she can show that the employer did not require the 
same of other employees.”74 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Pregnancy Discrimination Act Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(k) (2000)). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Wendy Ray and Michelle Bell, Pregnancy Discrimination, 1 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 617, 620 
(2000). 
Encompassing discrimination on the basis of ‘pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions,’ the PDA proscribes, for any job-related purpose, 
discriminatory treatment of a female applicant or employee on the basis that she 
has been or is pregnant; has given birth or intends to give birth in the future; or 
has obtained, is presently seeking, or contemplating an abortion. The PDA covers 
not only female employees but also the spouses of male employees. 
Id. at 621. 
 72. Id. at 621. 
 73. Id. at 622; see also Jessica Bergin, “Ability” Means Ability: An Ability-Centric Interpretation 
that Reinvigorates the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s Protections for Pregnant Workers, 36 WOMEN’S 
RTS. L. REP. 36, 36 (2014); Jeanette Blair, Pregnancy Discrimination, 2 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 595, 598-
600 (2001); Brake & Grossman, supra note 19, at 76; Jamie Clanton, Toward Eradicating Pregnancy 
Discrimination At Work: Interpreting the PDA to “Mean What It Says,” 86 . 703, 707 (2001); Joanna 
Grossman & Gillian Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: Overcoming the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act’s Capacity-Based Model, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 15, 41 (2009); Millsap, supra note 19, at 1425. 
 74. Ray & Bell, supra note 71, at 622 (“Courts have declined to characterize the PDA as a medical 
leave act; thus, employers do not violate the PDA by discharging an employee for poor attendance in 
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II. ANALYSIS: THE STATE OF STATES 
Before assessing the manner in which Georgia might enact 
pregnancy discrimination laws, it is important to analyze how other 
states have approached creating such policies as a comparison. The 
first states to expand their employment laws to grant additional 
protections to pregnant employees included Hawaii and Louisiana.75 
Hawaii requires employers to “make every reasonable 
accommodation to the needs of the female affected by disability due 
to and resulting from pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions.” 76  In Louisiana, employers must grant pregnant 
employees the same benefits or privileges of employment that are 
granted to temporarily disabled employees, including transfers to less 
strenuous or hazardous positions.77 An employer must grant a request 
for temporary job transfer so long as the request is one the employer 
can reasonably accommodate.78  A number of other states enacted 
laws requiring that employers make reasonable accommodations for 
pregnant employees, including Illinois, Alaska, California, 
Connecticut, Delaware, New Jersey, Maryland, West Virginia, and 
Texas.79 These states can loosely be classified into three categories.80 
                                                                                                                 
connection with a pregnancy, provided that the same poor attendance standards are applied to other 
employees.”). 
 75. Marcum & Perry, supra note 25. 
 76. HAW. CODE R. § 12-46-107 (1990). 
An employer shall not exclude from employment a pregnant female applicant 
because of her pregnancy. It is an unlawful discriminatory practice to discharge a 
female from employment or to penalize her in terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment because she requires time away from work for disability due to and 
resulting from pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. 
Id. 
 77. LA. STAT. ANN. § 23: 342 (1997). 
 78. Id. It is an unlawful practice for employers: 
[T]o refuse to temporarily transfer a pregnant female employee to a less strenuous 
or hazardous position for the duration of her pregnancy if she so requests, with 
the advice of her physician, where such transfer can be reasonably 
accommodated, provided, however, that no employers shall be required by this 
Part to create additional employment which the employer would not otherwise 
have created, nor shall such employer be required to discharge any employee, 
transfer any employee with more seniority, or promote any employee who is not 
qualified to perform the job. 
Id.; see also Gerald Huffman, The New Louisiana Employment Statutes: What Hath the Legislature 
Wrought, 58 LA. L. REV. 1033, 1058 (1998). 
 79. Marcum & Perry, supra note 25. 
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A. States That Require Accommodation Even Without A Doctor’s 
Note 
Illinois’s statute requires employers to make reasonable 
accommodations for both full-time and part-time pregnant employees 
during and immediately after their pregnancies.81 For the purposes of 
the statute, reasonable accommodations include “frequent or longer 
bathroom breaks, breaks for increased water intake, and breaks for 
periodic rest, seating, assistance with manual labor, light duty, 
temporary transfer to a less strenuous or hazardous position, the 
provision of an accessible worksite; acquisition or modification of 
equipment, job restructuring, and leave necessitated by pregnancy.”82 
Employers are not mandated to undergo undue hardship in granting 
such accommodations and are required to post notices of pregnant 
employee rights in the workplace.83 Defenders of the law declared 
that its provisions represented common sense legislation: “These are 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Amanda Haverstick, Proliferating State & Local Pregnancy Accommodation Laws Make 
Modifying ADA/FMLA Procedures A Must For Most Employers, FORBES (June 17, 2014, 2:15 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/theemploymentbeat/2014/06/17/proliferating-state-local-pregnancy-
accommodation-laws-make-modifying-adafmla-procedures-a-must-for-most-employers/print/. 
 81. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-102(I)–(J) (West 2015). 
If after a job applicant or employee, including a part-time, full-time, or 
probationary employee, requests reasonable accommodation, for an employer to 
not make reasonable accommodations for any medical or common condition of a 
job applicant or employee related to pregnancy or childbirth, unless the employer 
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the 
ordinary operation of the business of the employer. 
Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
No employer is required by this subdivision to create additional employment that 
the employer would not otherwise have created, unless the employer does so or 
would do so for other classes of employees who need accommodation. The 
employer is not required to discharge any employee, transfer any employee with 
more seniority, or promote any employee who is not qualified to perform the job, 
unless the employer does so or would do so to accommodate other classes of 
employers who need it . . . . For an employer to fail to post or keep posted in a 
conspicuous location on the premises of the employer where notices to employers 
are customarily posted, or fail to include in any employee handbook information 
concerning an employee’s rights under this Article, a notice, to be prepared or 
approved by the Department, summarizing the requirements of this article and 
information pertaining to the filing of a charge, including the right to be free from 
unlawful discrimination and the right to certain reasonable accommodations. 
Id. 
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women who are healthy and want to continue working . . . .They’re 
not looking to get out of work. What they want is a temporary 
accommodation.” 84  The law passed the state legislature in a 
unanimous vote.85 Critics of the law, however, complained that it was 
not encompassing enough because it only applied to employers with 
fifteen or more employees.86 
Connecticut requires employers to make reasonable efforts to 
temporarily transfer pregnant employees to a suitable position when a 
woman informs the employer in writing of the need, and the 
employee or employer reasonably believes that continued 
employment in the previous position could cause injury to the woman 
or her baby. 87  Connecticut law does not require written 
documentation from a health care provider. 88  Critics of the 
Connecticut law condemned the lack of health care provider 
oversight and expressed worries that pregnant women would take 
advantage of their pregnancies by asking for accommodations that 
were not needed.89 
B. States That Require Accommodation with Advice from A Physician 
Another group of states require accommodations with the advice 
of a physician. Alaska requires employers to give pregnant 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Marsha Mercer, States Adding More Protections for Pregnant Workers, THE FLORIDA TIMES-
UNION (Jan. 9, 2015), http://jacksonville.com/breaking-news/2015-01-09/story/states-adding-more-
protections-pregnant-workers. 
 85. Brigid Schulte, States Move to Ensure Pregnant Workers Get Fair Chance to Stay on Job, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-people/wp/2014/09/08/ 
states-move-where-congress-wont-to-ensure-pregnant-workers-get-fair-shot-to-stay-on-job/. 
 86. Pregnancy Protections for Workers in States and Localities, A BETTER BALANCE (July 2016), 
http://www.abetterbalance.org/web/images/stories/State_and_Local_PWFA_List.pdf. 
 87. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(7)(A)–(G) (2011). It is unlawful for an employer: 
[T]o terminate a woman’s employment because of her pregnancy; to fail or refuse 
to make a reasonable effort to transfer a pregnant employee to any suitable 
temporary position which may be available in any case in which an employee 
gives written notice of her pregnancy to her employer and the employer and the 
employer or pregnant employee reasonably believes that continued employment 
in the position held by the pregnant employee may cause injury to the employee 
or the fetus. 
Id. 
 88. See id. 
 89. Mercer, supra note 84. 
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employees whose health is affected by their pregnancy the same 
employment benefits and any other privileges that are granted to 
other employees who are similarly disabled. 90  This includes the 
ability to take disability leave, sick leave, or other accrued leave that 
the employer chooses to make available to other temporarily disabled 
employees.91 Alaska also allows for the employee to request that her 
employer transfer her to a suitable position. 92  In a similar vein, 
California prohibits employers from refusing to provide reasonable 
accommodations for pregnant employees, so long as the 
accommodations are made with the advice of a health care 
provider. 93  Employers must not refuse temporary transfer for 
pregnant employees to less strenuous or hazardous positions for the 
duration of pregnancy. 94  The California Chamber of Commerce 
initially took issue with the law, arguing that the lack of definition for 
reasonable accommodation would lead to an increase in litigation.95 
                                                                                                                 
 90. ALASKA STAT. § 39.20.500(a) (2013). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
A pregnant employee may request a transfer to a suitable position under this 
section. An employer may not fill the position with a person other than the 
requesting employee until the employer has offered the position to the employee 
and the employee has refused the offer. A position is suitable if it is an existing 
unfilled position in the same administrative division in which the employee is 
currently employed and less strenuous or less hazardous than the employee’s 
current position; transfer to the position is recommended by a licensed health care 
provider; the employee is qualified and immediately able to perform the duties of 
the position; and the transfer will not subject the employer to legal liability under 
a collective bargaining contract or employment contract. 
Id. 
 93. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12945 (1)-(2) (West 2012) (It shall be unlawful “for an employer to refuse 
to provide reasonable accommodation for an employee for a condition related to pregnancy, childbirth, 
or a related medical condition, if she so requests, with the advice of her health care provider”). 
 94. Id. It shall be unlawful: 
[F]or any employer to refuse to temporarily transfer a pregnant female employee 
to a less strenuous or hazardous position for the duration of her pregnancy if she 
so requests, with the advice of her physician, where that transfer can be 
reasonably accommodated. However, no employer shall be required by this 
section to create additional employment that the employer would not otherwise 
have created, no shall the employer be required to discharge any employee, 
transfer any employee with more seniority, or promote any employee who is not 
qualified to perform the job. 
Id. 
 95. OFFICE OF SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS, BILL ANALYSIS A.B. 1670, 1999–2000 Reg. Sess. (Ca. 
1999). 
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The Chamber also raised concerns about costs for small businesses 
associated with required accommodations, and expressed 
reservations that requiring accommodations would create hardships 
for businesses. 96  Legislators, however, viewed existing law as 
adequately defining reasonable accommodation, and the objection 
was passed over.97 
The state of New Jersey recognizes that “women are vulnerable to 
discrimination in the workplace”98 such that the Legislature intends 
to combat such discrimination by “requiring employers to provide 
reasonable accommodations to pregnant women and those who suffer 
medical conditions related to pregnancy and childbirth.”99 Examples 
of reasonable accommodations include: “bathroom breaks, breaks for 
increased water intake, periodic rest, assistance with manual labor, 
job restructuring or modified work schedules, and temporary 
transfers to less strenuous or hazardous work.” 100  New Jersey 
exempts employers from needing to provide reasonable 
accommodations if they can show that the accommodations will 
cause undue hardship.101 The bill’s proponents emphasized that it did 
not seek to treat women favorably, but equally under the law102, and a 
sign of their success was that only a single member of the legislature 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. California law stated that a reasonable accommodation was defined as “making existing 
facilities used by employees readily accessible to, and usable by, individuals with disabilities, or job 
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or 
modification of equipment or devices.” Id. 
 98. S.B. 2995, 215th Leg., Reg. Sess., (N.J. 2013). 
 99. Id.; N.J. Rev. Stat. § 10:5-12(s) (2014). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. It is unlawful for: 
[A]n employer to treat, for employment-related purposes, a woman employee that 
the employer knows, or should know, is affected by pregnancy in a manner less 
favorable than the treatment of other persons not affected by pregnancy but 
similar in their ability or inability to work. In addition, an employer of an 
employee who is a woman affected by pregnancy shall make available to the 
employee reasonable accommodation . . . unless the employer can demonstrate 
that providing the accommodation would be an undue hardship on the business 
operations of the employer. 
Id. 
 102. See Testimony on S.B. No. 2995 to the Senate Labor Committee, 215th Leg., Reg. Sess., (N.J. 
2013) (submitted by Ari Rosmarin, Public Policy Director, American Civil Liberties Union of New 
Jersey) (Nov. 7, 2013). 
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voted against the bill.103 Opponents of the legislation noted that it 
would give pregnant women an unfair advantage in the workplace 
and would shift work responsibilities and burdens unfairly to non-
pregnant employees.104 
West Virginia passed the Pregnant Workers’ Fairness Act, which 
requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for 
pregnancy that an employer would make for temporary disabilities 
not related to pregnancy.105 Employees cannot be forced to accept an 
accommodation that they do not want to accept, and an employee 
cannot be forced into taking leave if an accommodation can be 
made.106 One critique of the bill may be that employers would be 
subject to innumerable costs associated with being forced to provide 
accommodations to pregnant women. At the same time, however, it 
was unclear whether such costs would constitute an undue hardship, 
although they pointed out that defining an undue hardship was 
extremely difficult. Passage of the law provided evidence, in the 
words of one supporter, “that this makes sense both as a matter of 
policy and politics in a lot of different places.”107 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Schulte, supra note 85. 
 104. Id. 
 105. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11B-2 (West 2014). It shall be unlawful for any employer: 
[N]ot to make reasonable accommodations to the known limitations related to the 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions of a job applicant or 
employee, following delivery by the applicant or employee of written 
documentation from the applicant’s or employee’s health care provider that 
specifies the applicant’s or employee’s limitations and suggesting what 
accommodations would address those limitations, unless such covered entity can 
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the 
operation of the business of such covered entity; deny employment opportunities 
to a job applicant or employee, if such denial is based on the refusal of the 
covered entity to make reasonable accommodations to the known limitations 
related to the pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions of an employee 
or applicant; require a job applicant or employee affected by pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions to accept an accommodation that such 
applicant or employee chooses not to accept. 
Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Bryce Covert, West Virginia Considers Bold New Protections for Pregnant Workers, 
THINKPROGRESS (Feb. 6, 2014), www.thinkprogress.org/economy/2014/06/3259061/west-virginia-
pregnant-workers/. 
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C. States Requiring Accommodation if Pregnancy Causes Disability 
A third group of states require accommodation if pregnancy causes 
disability. Delaware requires that employers make reasonable 
accommodations for employees who are limited on the basis of 
pregnancy, unless those accommodations impose an undue hardship 
on the employer. 108  Employers also may not deny employment 
opportunities, require an employee to take leave, or take an adverse 
action against the employee using a reasonable accommodation.109 
The law passed the state legislature in a rare unanimous vote, 
demonstrating broad support from civil rights groups to the business 
community. 110  Minnesota requires reasonable accommodations for 
pregnant women, on par with those required for non-pregnant 
persons who are similar in their ability or inability to work.111 The 
statute also requires transferring pregnant women to less strenuous or 
hazardous jobs, if such a transfer can reasonably be 
accommodated. 112  However, it only applied to businesses with 
                                                                                                                 
 108. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit.19 § 711 (West 2014). 
 109. Id. An employer may not: 
[D]eny employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee, if such denial is 
based on the need of the employer to make reasonable accommodations to the 
known limitations related to the pregnancy of an employee or applicant for 
employment; require an applicant for employment or employee affected by 
pregnancy to accept an accommodation that such applicant or employee chooses 
not to accept; require an employee to take leave under any leave law or policy of 
the employer if another reasonable accommodation can be provided to the known 
limitations related to the pregnancy of the employee; or take adverse action 
against any employee in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment for 
requesting or using a reasonable accommodation to the known limitations related 
to the pregnancy of the employee. 
Id. 
 110. Schulte, supra note 85. 
 111. MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 (2015). 
 112. Id. 
Except when based on a bona fide occupational qualification, it is an unfair 
employment practice for an employer with a number of part-time or full-time 
employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the 
current of preceding calendar year equal to or greater than 25 effective July 1, 
1992, and equal to or greater than 15 effective July 1, 1994, an employment 
agency, or a labor organization, not to make reasonable accommodation to the 
known disability of a qualified disabled person or job applicant unless the 
employer, agency, or organization can demonstrate that the accommodation 
would impose an undue hardship on the business, agency, or organization. 
‘Reasonable accommodation’ means steps which must be taken to accommodate 
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twenty-one or more employees, leaving a large number of small 
businesses exempt from its requirements.113 
In 2013, Maryland enacted the Reasonable Accommodations for 
Pregnant Workers Act. 114  The Act requires employees to grant 
reasonable accommodations to pregnant employees and dictates that 
employers engage in every effort to find reasonable alternative means 
of accommodation. 115  Reasonable accommodations under the law 
include “(1) changing the employee’s job duties; (2) changing the 
employee’s work hours; (3) relocating the employee’s work area; (4) 
providing mechanical or electrical aids; (5) transferring the employee 
to a less strenuous or less hazardous position; (6) or providing 
leave.”116 The debate over the Maryland bill also raised concerns 
about costs associated with accommodations and the burden placed 
on particularly small businesses. 117  Advocates countered that the 
undue burden requirement would help ensure that any costs imposed 
would be minimal.118 
As this analysis of state pregnancy discrimination laws shows, a 
discernable trend exists in state laws towards greater protections for 
pregnant women in the workplace, in spite of objections focusing on 
cost, fairness, and the breadth of the laws themselves. Despite this 
trend, the state of Georgia provides no additional protections beyond 
what federal law requires. 119  In particular, Georgia law fails to 
provide specific prohibitions against pregnancy discrimination, with 
                                                                                                                 
the known physical or mental limitations of a qualified disabled person. 
‘Reasonable accommodation’ may include but is not limited to, nor does it 
necessarily require: (1) making facilities readily accessible to and usable by 
disabled persons; and (2) job restructuring, modified work schedules, 
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or 
devices, and the provision of aides on a temporary or periodic basis. 
Id. 
 113. Pregnancy Protections, supra note 86. 
 114. MD. CODE. ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-609 (West 2013). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. (“If an employee requests a transfer to a less strenuous or less hazardous position as a 
reasonable accommodation, the employer shall transfer the employee for a period of time up to the 
duration of the employee’s pregnancy.”). 
 117. MARYLAND DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, H.B. 804, 2013 Sess. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Employment Protections for Workers Who Are Pregnant or Nursing, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/wb/map/index.htm#Georgia (last visited Nov. 15, 2016). 
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the exception of state employees.120 Georgia does not provide for 
accommodations for pregnancy under its law.121 Finally, Georgia is 
silent on pregnancy-related disability accommodation. 122  As the 
state-level analysis clearly shows, Georgia is increasingly becoming 
an outlier with regard to protecting against pregnancy discrimination 
in the workplace. 
III. ANALYSIS: THE IMPACT OF YOUNG 
United Parcel Service (UPS) hired Peggy Young as an early 
morning “air driver” and she worked on a part-time basis in 2006 and 
2007.123 As a condition of the job, UPS expected Young to be able to 
“‘lift, lower, push, pull, leverage and manipulate’ items ‘weighing up 
to [seventy] pounds[,]’” and to be able to “[a]ssist in moving 
packages weighing up to 150 pounds.”124 In 2005, Young began in 
vitro fertilization in an effort to get pregnant, and was ultimately 
successful after three attempts.125 She then presented a note to her 
supervisor from her doctor recommending that she not lift more than 
twenty pounds while on the job.126 Young’s supervisor concluded 
that she could not perform the essential functions of her job any 
longer and, per UPS policy, did not qualify for light duty or an 
alternative work assignment because her restriction was not a 
consequence of an on-the-job injury.127 Despite having exhausted her 
medical leave, UPS granted Young an unpaid leave of absence, and 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Id.; Georgia—Laws Relating to Pregnancy, LEGAL MOMENTUM, 
https://www.legalmomentum.org/content/georgia-laws-relating-pregnancy (last visited Nov. 15, 2016); 
GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 478-1-.03 (2017). 
 121. Georgia—Laws Relating to Pregnancy, supra note 122. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. DKC 08-2586, 2011 WL 665321, at *1 (D. Md., Feb. 14, 
2011). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at *3–4. Young had repeatedly asked for and been granted leaves of absence during her 
attempts at becoming pregnant. Id. 
 126. Id. at *4. Young’s doctor did not feel that a full restriction was warranted at that point in the 
pregnancy and thus only made a recommendation that her lifting be kept to less than 20 pounds. Id. 
 127. Young, 2011 WL 665321, at *5. UPS argued that kinds of persons who were granted 
accommodations were drivers disabled on the job, those who has lost their Department of 
Transportation certificates or those who suffered a disability covered by the Americans with Disabilities 
Act. Id. at *11. 
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she lost her medical coverage at the end of 2006. 128  Shortly 
thereafter, Young filed a charge with the EEOC alleging 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 129  “The District Court 
granted summary judgment to UPS, and the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed.”130 The case was then appealed to the Supreme 
Court.131 
The Court in Young issued a number of important holdings in its 
decision with significant implications for pregnancy discrimination. 
First, the Court reviewed the text of the PDA and determined that its 
language “requires courts to consider the extent to which an 
employer’s policy treats pregnant workers less favorably than it treats 
non-pregnant workers similar in their ability or inability to work.”132 
The Court also reasoned that it must “consider any legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory, nonpretextual justification for these differences in 
treatment.”133 In sum, the Court was tasked with determining whether 
a company’s policy burdened pregnant women and, if so, whether 
this burden constituted intentional discrimination.134 
Second, Young argued that if UPS accommodated any employees 
with a lifting restriction, then it was obligated to accommodate 
pregnant employees with a similar lifting restriction.135 The Court 
rejected this argument as unsound.136 This position, according to the 
Court, would seem to say that the statute grants pregnant workers a 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Id. at *6. Young gave birth to her child in 2007 and took a maternity leave to spend time with her 
baby. She also did not feel physically or emotionally ready to return to work at that time. After 
approximately two months, Young indicated she wished to return to work and she was allowed to do so, 
resuming the same position she held before the pregnancy. Id. 
 129. Id. Young also claimed discrimination on the basis of race but voluntarily dismissed the racial 
discrimination issue after discovery did not support such a claim in the case. Id. at *7. 
 130. Kay H. Hodge, Pregnancy Discrimination & Young v. UPS: Employers’ Duties, AM. L. INST. 
(2015). 
 131. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). 
 132. Id. at 1344; contra Pelkey v. Colo. Dep’t of Labor & Emp., No. 14-CV-02205-RBJ, 2015 WL 
1740453, at *4 (D. Co. 2015) (holding that a plaintiff who alleges sex-based discrimination, but does not 
show that her employer treated her disability differently from those similarly situated, cannot succeed on 
her discrimination claim). 
 133. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 1349. The Court reflected that the second clause of the PDA required employers to provide 
the same accommodations to pregnant employees as they did to workplace disabilities that had other 
cause but were similar in their effects. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1349. 
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“most-favored-nation status,” and this could not have been Congress’ 
intent when passing the PDA.137 Young’s approach would have been 
too broad in relieving a protesting worker of any burden to prove that 
bias against her was intentional pregnancy discrimination. 138 
Similarly, the Court also rejected UPS’s argument that the second 
clause of the PDA does nothing more than “define sex discrimination 
to include pregnancy discrimination.”139 Such a reading of the second 
clause of the PDA, commentators pointed out, would render it 
redundant and without purpose.140 
Third, the Court held that a pregnant worker attempting to 
establish disparate treatment could accomplish this through “indirect 
evidence” by applying the McDonnell Douglas framework. That 
framework requires that the plaintiff present a prima facie case by 
demonstrating that she (1) belongs to a protected class, (2) sought 
accommodation, (3) the employer did not grant that accommodation, 
and (4) the employer accommodated others similar in their ability or 
inability to work.141 The employer may then seek to offer a rationale 
for its refusal to accommodate the plaintiff as long as the reason is 
nondiscriminatory in nature.142 This “burden-shifting” analysis by the 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Id. at 1349–50. 
As long as an employer provides one or two workers with an accommodation—
say, those with particularly hazardous jobs, or those whose workplace presence is 
particularly needed, or those who have worked at the company for many years, or 
those who are over the age of 55—then it must provide similar accommodations 
to all pregnant workers (with comparable physical limitations), irrespective of the 
nature of their jobs, the employer’s need to keep them working, their ages, or any 
other criteria. 
Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1349–50. 
 138. Lyle Denniston, Fashioning a Remedy for Pregnancy Bias, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 15, 2015), 
www.scotusblog.com/2015/03/opinion-analysis-fashioning-a-remedy-for-pregnancy-bias/. 
 139. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1349; Denniston, supra note 140. 
 140. Denniston, supra note 140. The Court reasoned that statutes should be construed in such a way 
that no clause should be taken as superfluous, void, or redundant. Id. The problem was that UPS’ 
reading of the PDA would create exactly that problem of the second clause. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1352–
53. 
 141. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 142. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354. (“But, consistent with the Act’s basic objective, that reason normally 
cannot consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or less convenient to add pregnant women to 
the category of those ‘similar in their ability or inability to work’ whom the employer accommodates.”); 
see also Martin v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 794, 819 (M.D. La. 2015) (holding that 
an employer’s insistence that a pregnant woman take an unwanted leave of absence did not constitute a 
reasonable accommodation as a matter of law). 
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Court allows for the burden of proof in a pregnancy discrimination 
case to be parsed between the plaintiff and the defendant depending 
on the proof that can be offered.143 
Finally, the Court reasoned that if the employer can show a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff may then attempt 
to show that the offered reasons are in fact pretextual.144 On this 
basis, the Court concluded: 
We believe that the plaintiff may reach a jury on this issue 
by providing sufficient evidence that the employer’s 
policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers, 
and that the employer’s “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” 
reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but 
rather—when considered along with the burden imposed—
give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.145 
This being said, the Court was not clear on what a “legitimate non-
discriminatory reason” might be for an employer’s failure to offer 
accommodations.146 This leaves unresolved the legitimate grounds on 
which an employer can refuse accommodation to a pregnant 
employee.147 
                                                                                                                 
 143. Sam DiPrimio, Special Delivery: Young v. United Parcel Service Revives the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act While Denying Life to EEOC Guidance, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 389, 408 (2015); see 
generally Nicole Dunlap & Leanne Mehrman, Supreme Court “Delivers” New Life to Pregnancy 
Discrimination Claims in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 89 FLA. B.J. 59 (2015); Kay Hodge, 
Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. Summary, 22 ALI-CLE 17 (2015); Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex 
Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995 (2015); Ellen Taylor, Nathan Koskella, & Paul 
Kang, Young. v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 62 FED. LAW 72 (2015); Brinton Wilkins, Supreme Court 
Weighs in on Disparate Treatment of Pregnant Employees, 20 UTAH EMP. L. LETTER 1 (2015). 
 144. Taylor et al., supra note 145. See also Grochowski v. Science Applications Intern, Corp., No. 
ELH–13–3771, 2015 WL 5334051, at*14 (D. Md. Sept. 11, 2015) (deciding that if a plaintiff can 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, an employer may introduce legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reasons for its actions, to which the plaintiff may respond that such reasons were a pretext for 
discrimination). 
 145. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354. 
 146. John DiMugno, Court Breathes New Life into the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 36 CAL. TORT 
REP. NL 1 (2015). The Court stated that it is not enough that a policy be stated in pregnancy-neutral 
terms and that a desire to avoid cost does not qualify either. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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In the end, the Court concluded that Young could create an issue 
of material fact of whether a significant burden exists by showing 
that her employer accommodates a large number of non-pregnant 
workers and refuses to accommodate a large number of pregnant 
workers.148 In so deciding, however, the Court left unanswered how 
many comparators are required to create an inference of 
discrimination, especially when dealing with companies of far 
smaller size than UPS.149 The Court also noted that Young could add 
to her evidence the fact that UPS has multiple policies to 
accommodate non-pregnant employees with lifting restrictions to 
show that its reasons for excluding pregnant women are not 
sufficiently strong and could give rise to an inference of intentional 
discrimination.150 This interpretation of the PDA is consistent with 
Congress’ decision to supersede Gilbert’s finding that denying 
coverage to pregnant women on a neutral basis was legal.151 As such, 
it remained for the Fourth Circuit to determine whether Young’s 
treatment compared to other non-pregnant employees was 
pretextual.152 
Young’s loss in the case would potentially enable employers to 
reject even reasonable accommodations for pregnant women.153 It 
would also leave “pregnancy in a growing gap between the PDA and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, despite the compatible and 
mutually reinforcing purposes of the two Acts.” 154  Moreover, as 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354. The Court reasoned that if the facts are as Young claims them to be, 
she could show that UPS accommodates most non-pregnant employees with lifting accommodations 
while completely refusing to accommodate pregnant employees with lifting accommodations. Id. 
 149. DiMugno, supra note 148. 
The Court made its observation that the accommodation of “many” workers with 
non-pregnancy-related limitations may establish an inference discriminatory 
intent in the context of a dispute with a large, multi-national corporation with 
thousands of employees. It is doubtful that the Court intended to limit the ability 
of employees at smaller companies with far fewer employees to prove a 
pregnancy discrimination claim. 
Id. 
 150. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354. 
 151. Id. at 1355. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Brake &Grossman, supra note 19, at 72. 
 154. Id. at 72–73 
Even though the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008 
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previously stated, while many states worked in the past to increase 
the protections for pregnant workers, no substitute exists for strong 
federal-level protections for pregnant female workers.155 
The Young case provides an easier route for plaintiffs to advance 
pregnancy accommodation claims that had previously not survived 
summary judgment. 156  It will also likely instigate more lawsuits 
under the PDA and give rise to a broader range of claims by pregnant 
women who believe they have been discriminated against in the 
workplace.157 This will hopefully reverse the trend in states such as 
Georgia with regard to pregnant plaintiffs establishing their 
pregnancy discrimination claims.158 Finally, Young increases pressure 
on states such as Georgia—states without any protections for 
pregnant women beyond federal law—to implement legislation to 
give guidance to employers on pregnancy discrimination laws and to 
grant protections to pregnant women without the need to file 
lawsuits. 
IV. PROPOSAL: GEORGIA’S PATH TO ACCOMMODATION 
Georgia’s decision not to implement any protections for working 
pregnant women beyond what is required by federal law is clearly 
                                                                                                                 
broadened the universe of disabilities that require accommodations to include 
temporary impairments and less severe impairments, normal pregnancy is still not 
considered to be an impairment under the ADA. And yet, since many of the 
temporary disabilities now protected under the ADAAA have similar work-
related effects as pregnancy, they should raise bar for accommodating pregnant 
workers as well. 
Id. 
 155. Deborah Brake & Joanna Grossman, Introduction to Amici Curiae Brief in Young v. United 
Parcel Service, Inc., 36 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 66, 73 (2014). 
 156. Robert Meyer, Supreme Court Issues Decision Regarding Accommodation of Pregnant 
Employees, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-
issues-decision-regarding-accommodation-pregnant-employees. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See generally Hubbard v. Meritage Homes of Fla., Inc., 520 F. App’x 859 (11th Cir. 2013); 
Grace v. Adtran, Inc., 470 F. App’x 812 (11th Cir. 2012); Slater v. ESG, Inc., 441 F. App’x 637 (11th 
Cir. 2011); Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 1999); Anderson v. Dunbar 
Armored, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (N.D. Ga. 2009); Welch v. Lincare, Inc., No. 7-09-CV-150 (HL), 
2011 WL 1303319 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 4, 2011); Walden v. Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc., No. 1:06-
CV-2394-WSD-WEJ, 2008 WL 269619 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2008); Sermons v. Fleetwood Homes of Ga., 
227 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (S.D. Ga. 2002). 
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out of step with what many other states are legislating.159 Pregnant 
women in Georgia are placed at increased risk of workplace 
discrimination, especially in terms of granting these women 
reasonable accommodations for pregnancy-related symptoms.160 As 
such, Georgia should enact a pregnancy discrimination law that 
closes the federal gap and ensures that pregnant women are afforded 
equal protection of the laws and their right to work. 
A. Adhering to the PDA’s Four Criteria 
The origin of the proposed Georgia law should consider careful 
adherence to the PDA’s four criteria for determining a related 
medical condition.161 First, the condition must be gender specific to 
females, which addresses the very heart of the intention of the Act, 
protecting women.162 Nothing in the history of the PDA indicates that 
its intention is to protect men or that its purpose is something other 
than protecting the rights of women.163 That being said, men are still 
given protection under Title VII against sex discrimination. 164 
Second, for a condition to constitute a related medical condition it 
must be based upon the mother’s status as an employee.165  In a 
number of instances, claims have been made under the PDA that 
appear consistent with the Act, yet courts have ruled that the 
                                                                                                                 
 159. See Employment Protections, supra note 121. States that have enacted pregnancy discrimination 
laws include Alaska, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, 
Oklahoma, Texas, Louisiana, Missouri, Iowa, Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, West Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Delaware, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and 
Florida. Id. States that have enacted legislation protecting workplace lactation and breastfeeding include 
Minnesota, Indiana and Tennessee. Id. States that have enacted both types of laws include California, 
Oregon, Montana, Colorado, New Mexico, Illinois, Arkansas, Mississippi, Virginia, New York, 
Vermont, Maine, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and the District of Columbia. Id. States not enacting either 
type of law include (CHANGED from “are”) Idaho, Kansas, Alabama, North Carolina, and Georgia. Id. 
 160. See Molly Edwards, The Conceivable Future of Pregnancy Discrimination Claims: Pregnancy 
Not Required, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 743, 751 (2010). 
 161. Id. at 750–51. 
 162. Id. at 750. In Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, the Supreme Court held that the PDA was 
enacted to “guarantee women the basic right to participate fully and equally in the workforce, without 
denying them the fundamental right to full participation in family life.” 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987) 
(emphasis added). 
 163. Edwards, supra note 162, at 751. 
 164. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Muller v. Oregon: One Hundred Years Later, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
359, 376 (2009). 
 165. Edwards, supra note 162, at 753. 
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activities were for the benefit of the child rather than the mother as an 
employee.166 To prevent an unfair advantage for female employees 
over males, the Act should only be applied to situations where the 
condition is primarily affecting the employee. 
Third, a “related medical condition” is one associated with 
pregnancy.167 The fact that “the general term ‘other related medical 
conditions’ follows the specific terms ‘pregnancy’ and ‘childbirth,’ 
[means] other related medical conditions must reference and 
therefore create a causal link to pregnancy, childbirth, or both.”168 
The Act narrowly focuses on pregnancy and pregnancy-related 
claims and is not intended to apply to every condition affecting 
women. 169  Finally, a related medical condition does not require 
favorable treatment of women protected by the Act, but only 
treatment equal to that given to employees with similar medical 
conditions.170  Thus, an employer who does not provide disability 
benefits to employees is not compelled under the Act to provide such 
benefits to pregnant women.171 
While these criteria relate to the PDA, they can serve as a 
guideline to Georgia in structuring a pregnancy discrimination law 
that carries out the PDA’s intentions. This would also help Georgia 
align itself with the Court’s decision in Young.172 The Court in Young 
made it more difficult for employers to offer a defense to PDA claims 
by allowing employees to prove discrimination through evidence that 
the employer’s policies posed a significant burden on pregnant 
workers.173 If the employer’s reasons for this discriminatory conduct 
                                                                                                                 
 166. See Fleming v. Ayers & Ass’n, 948 F.2d 993, 996–97 (6th Cir. 1991); Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, 
Inc. 960 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D. Colo. 1997); McNill v. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. 950 F. Supp. 564, 569–70 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 167. Edwards, supra note 162, at 754. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 755 (“Without unequal treatment compared to a person ‘not so affected but similar in their 
ability or inability to work,’ a protected woman would not have a claim under the PDA.”). 
 171. Id. It was not the intention of Congress that the Act create a system of preferential treatment for 
women or a scheme in which women enjoyed some favored advantage under the law. Id. Women were 
simply to be treated equally under the law and placed on par with all other employees. Edwards, supra 
note 162, at 755. 
 172. Dunlap & Mehrman, supra note 145. 
 173. Id. 
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are not sufficient to justify the burden, this insufficiency can create 
something analogous to a disparate impact claim wherein the 
employer is held responsible for conduct even in the absence of 
intent to discriminate.174 
Georgia, like all states, is interested in protecting employers as 
well as pregnant women. Protecting pregnant workers is essential for 
families in that it allows pregnant women to maintain their income. 
Further, businesses benefit by keeping productive employees on the 
job, and women can feel comfortable about the health of the unborn 
when they do not feel compelled to perform work that their doctors 
recommend they should avoid.175 The Court’s decision in Young also 
places employers on more uncertain ground than in the past in 
dealing with pregnancy discrimination claims.176 Georgia can help to 
fill this void with clear legislation that articulates the duties and 
responsibilities of employers when confronting pregnancy in the 
workplace. 
B. Right of Accommodation 
To be truly effective, however, Georgia law should go beyond the 
PDA and guarantee a right of accommodation for pregnant women in 
the workplace. To accomplish this legislation, Georgia would do well 
to model its legislation on the Americans with Disabilities Act.177 
The ADA was enacted in 1990 and amended in 2008 and exists to 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability.178 Additionally, the 
ADA requires employers to reasonably accommodate employees 
with disabilities with the exception of when those accommodations 
                                                                                                                 
 174. Id. 
 175. Allison Steinberg, Top 10 Reasons Why Protecting Pregnant Workers Is Good for Us All, ACLU 
(Dec. 15, 2015), www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/top-10-reasons-why-protecting-pregnant-workers-
good-us-all. 
 176. DiMugno, supra note 148. 
 177. Mikaela Shaw, The Resurgence of the Maternal Wall: Revisiting Accommodation Under the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 565, 601 (2014); see also Joanna Grossman, 
Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEORGETOWN L. J. 567, 625 (2010); 
Maryn Oyoung, Until Men Bear Children, Women Must Not Bear the Costs of Reproductive Capacity: 
Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace to Achieve Equal Employment Opportunities, 44 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 515, 529–36 (2013); Widiss, supra note 37, at 1035. 
 178. Simon, supra note 19, at 270. 
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would cause an “undue hardship.”179 Initially after the passage of the 
ADA, the Supreme Court construed the Act narrowly and required a 
demanding standard for someone being able to qualify as disabled.180 
Congress responded to this constricted interpretation by passing the 
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA). 181  The ADAAA 
expanded the ADA significantly, broadening the definition of 
disability and making a point to extend protections to previously 
excluded conditions. 182  The ADAAA expanded the definition of 
disability to include: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities . . . ; (B) a record 
of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an 
impairment.” 183  Major life activities now include “performing 
manual tasks” and “sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, and 
bending.”184 Moreover, the statute makes clear that the condition is 
not required to last longer than six months to qualify for ADA 
coverage.185 
Given that the ADAAA now covers temporary conditions, it seems 
natural that the ADAAA would apply to pregnancy and that the 
ADAAA’s accommodations requirements would be applicable to 
pregnant workers. This has not, however, proven to be the case. 
Some courts hold that pregnancy cannot be a disability because it 
represents a natural life process. 186  Other courts focus on the 
                                                                                                                 
 179. Id. 
 180. Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197–98 (2002) (“We hold that to be 
substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents 
or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s 
daily lives. The impairment’s impact must also be permanent or long term.”); see also Stevens v. 
Stubbs, 576 F. Supp. 1409, 1414 (N.D. Ga. 1983). 
 181. Simon, supra note 19, at 271. 
 182. Id. See also Amelia Joiner, The ADAAA: Opening the Floodgates, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 331, 
360–61 (2010); Nicole Porter, The New ADA Backlash, 82 TENN. L. REV. 1, 17 (2014); Joan Williams et 
al., A Sip of Cool Water: Pregnancy Accommodation After the ADA Amendments Act, 32 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 97, 99, 112 (2013); Michelle Travis, Impairment as Protected Status: A New Universality 
for Disability Rights, 46 GA. L. REV. 937, 938 (2012); Carol Miller, EEOC Reinforces Broad 
Interpretation of ADAAA Disability Qualification: But What Does “Substantially Limits” Mean?, 76 
MO. L. REV. 43, 56 (2011); Kevin Barry, Brian East & Marcy Karin, Pleading Disability After the 
ADAAA, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 1 (2013). 
 183. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(C) (2012). 
 184. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). 
 185. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2012). 
 186. Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Commc’ns, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 473 (D. Kan. 1996) 
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voluntary nature of pregnancy as a reason to disqualify it from 
disability coverage.187 Additionally, the EEOC provided guidance in 
which it stated that “conditions, such as pregnancy, that are not the 
result of a physiological disorder are . . . not impairments” with 
respect to the ADAAA.188 At the same time, the EEOC has also 
stated that, while pregnancy is not a disability under the ADA, 
pregnancy-related impairments may be significant enough to be 
covered under the ADAAA.189 
C. Comparators 
Despite the reluctance to bring pregnant women under the auspices 
of the ADA at the federal level, the ADA accommodations model 
should serve as a guide for Georgia in crafting legislation at the state 
level. A number of states have already used the ADA’s language in 
crafting their own pregnancy discrimination laws.190 There are also 
compelling reasons why the ADA’s language and structure would be 
a good model for Georgia. First, many women require 
accommodations in the workplace to continue working during 
pregnancy. In particular, women in physically demanding jobs are 
most likely to lose their jobs after becoming pregnant.191 Women 
most likely to be affected by lack of accommodations on the job are 
                                                                                                                 
Pregnancy is a physiological condition, but it is not a disorder. Being the natural 
consequence of a properly functioning reproductive system, pregnancy cannot be 
called an impairment. All of the physiological conditions and changes related to a 
pregnancy are also not impairments unless they exceed normal ranges or are 
attributable to some disorder. 
Id. 
 187. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976). See also Serednyj v. Beverly 
Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 553 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 188. Section 1630.2(h) Physical or Mental Impairment, Appendix to Part 1630—Interpretive 
Guidance on Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. (2011). 
 189. Simon, supra note 19, at 273. Courts have been split in recognizing the EEOC reasoning. In 
Price v. UTI, Nayak v. St. Vincent Hospital, and Alexander v. Trilogy Health Services, courts have found 
in favor of pregnancy and disability discrimination claims and have validated the EEOC’s line of 
thinking. In other instances, however, courts have refused to follow the EEOC’s lead. See Price v. UTI, 
No. 4:11-CV-1428 CAS, 2013 WL 798014, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 5, 2013); Nayak v. St. Vincent 
Hospital, No. 1:12-CV-0817-RLY-MJD, 2013 WL 121838 at *3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2013); Alexander v. 
Trilogy, No. 1:11-CV-295, 2012 WL 5268701 at *11–12 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2012). 
 190. See supra Part III. 
 191. Cox, supra note 26, at 453. 
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those who work in historically male professions and women in low-
income employment.192 In these occupations, women are often placed 
in the unenviable position of choosing between their health and the 
health of their unborn children or their careers. Accommodations for 
such women during pregnancy are imperative. 
Second, contrary to the fears of many feminists that characterizing 
pregnancy as a disability would stigmatize pregnant women and 
make them appear less capable of doing their jobs, the ADAAA’s 
recent expansion would create just the opposite perception. If 
Georgia embraces the ADA’s accommodations language for pregnant 
women in the workplace, there is little fear that it would be 
characterizing pregnant women as disabled and not capable of 
performing their work.193 Rather than drawing renewed attention to 
pregnancy’s physical limitations, the ADA’s accommodations 
framework would simply place pregnancy on the same footing as 
“diabetes, arthritis, asthma, and back problems that impose short-
term lifting restrictions.” 194  Pregnancy becomes just one more 
physical condition that may necessitate accommodations for certain 
types of jobs. It imposes no more of a stigma than other conditions 
creating a short-term disability in need of accommodation. 
Third, Georgia’s use of the ADA accommodations model for its 
legislation provides a useful comparator for litigation that requires 
                                                                                                                 
 192. Id. 
Rigid work rules restrict workers’ ability to consume water, vary their working 
positions, and curtail repetitive, physically demanding activities. In these 
industries, women able to fully conform to employer expectations oriented around 
male norms during the rest of their work lives predictably lose their jobs when 
they become pregnant. This job loss not only directly reduces the number of 
women in predominately male occupations but also indirectly contributes to 
occupational sex segregation by discouraging other women from pursuing jobs 
they risk losing when they become pregnant. 
Id. 
 193. Id. at 468–69. 
 194. Id. at 472 
[By way] of comparison, whereas over 40 percent of the population will become 
pregnant at some point in their lives, less than 2 percent of the population is 
pregnant each year. Accordingly, in any given year, the number of persons with 
diabetes and hypertension (as well as the probably larger number of persons with 
back problems) eligible for ADA accommodations will likely eclipse the number 
of eligible pregnant workers. 
Id. 
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assessment of accommodations needs for pregnant women. For 
example, “many pregnant workers who are denied accommodations” 
would be able to “point to similarly impaired employees with ADA 
accommodations as comparators who were treated better.” 195 
Moreover, the expansion of pregnancy as a comparator to ADA-
covered employees is crucial for maintaining the integrity of the PDA 
itself.196 Without including pregnancy as a disability, the group of 
comparators for PDA plaintiffs would shrink to an inconsequential 
amount. Plaintiffs would then find it virtually impossible “to identify 
a ‘large percentage’ of non-pregnant, impaired workers who were 
treated better because those workers would be covered by the ADA, 
and therefore unavailable.” 197  Pregnant workers would effectively 
become the only temporarily impaired employees not subject to 
accommodations in the workplace. This result falls far short of the 
demand of courts that pregnant employees be treated equally to other 
workers and undermines the purpose of the PDA. This result cannot 
be what Georgia intends and, therefore, necessitates the 
implementation of the ADA accommodations model into pregnancy 
discrimination legislation. 
On the other hand, Georgia is a right-to-work state and is known 
for having a business friendly environment.198 Legislation following 
the ADAAA accommodations model has been proposed in Georgia 
but has not been passed.199 Part of the reason for the lack of passage 
is continued concerns on the part of businesses about the costs of 
                                                                                                                 
 195. Simon, supra note 19, at 276. (“Given courts’ traditional reluctance to view pregnancy-related 
impairments as disabilities, as well as the Supreme Court’s emphasis in Young on the centrality of the 
McDonnell Douglas framework to proving pregnancy discrimination claims, this expansion of the pool 
of comparators available to PDA claimants may prove to be critical.”). 
 196. Widiss, supra note 37, at 1024–25. 
 197. Simon, supra note 19, at 276. Since the ADAAA was enacted, no court has explicitly addressed 
whether PDA plaintiffs may use ADA-covered workers as comparators. Id. Some early cases suggest 
that the comparison is inappropriate and some scholars have agreed with this assessment. Id. But most 
of these judgments were taken pre-Young and have not been update given the Court’s ruling in that case. 
Id. To date, no case has explicitly stated that ADA comparators were never available to PDA plaintiffs 
and other cases suggest the comparisons are completely appropriate. Id. 
 198. See Georgia Right to Work Laws, FINDLAW.COM, statelaws.findlaw.com/georgia-law/georgia-
right-to-work-laws.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); America’s Top States for Business 2014, CNBC, 
www.cnbc.com/2014/06/24/americas-top-states-for-business.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2015). 
 199. S.B. 417, 152d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2013). 
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requiring accommodations for pregnant women and the desire for 
independence and autonomy in structuring business operations and 
handling personnel issues.200 Put simply, businesses tend to resist 
further regulations on their practices rather than to embrace them. 
Moreover, many businesses still balk at the idea of making 
accommodations for a condition that is largely a product of personal 
choice, and see such accommodations as being unfair to other non-
pregnant workers. 201  Therefore, the path to accommodations for 
pregnant women in Georgia will likely remain an uphill struggle. 
CONCLUSION 
The PDA intended to provide broad protections for pregnant 
women in the workplace by ending pregnancy discrimination and 
providing women with legal avenues to pursue claims for alleged 
discriminatory activity by employers. While the PDA advanced the 
cause of equality in the workplace to a large extent, many states have 
gone beyond the PDA to incorporate accommodations legislation that 
mandates employers to provide reasonable accommodations to 
pregnant employees. Georgia, thus far, has been reluctant to join this 
growing list and has left pregnant employees without the benefit of 
the full protection of the law. As such, Georgia should pass 
accommodation legislation to ensure the equal treatment of pregnant 
women in the workplace. 
Georgia has a vested interest in protecting the health and wellbeing 
of working mothers, while recognizing the financial obligations 
many women have requiring them to continue working throughout 
their pregnancies. In an ideal situation, women would have the 
financial resources to choose whether they remain employed during 
pregnancy. The time has come for Georgia to recognize that pregnant 
workers often cannot afford to be out of work and most certainly 
cannot risk losing their jobs. Women simply should not be forced to 
choose between being pregnant and being employed. Reasonable 
                                                                                                                 
 200. Cox, supra note 26, at 477. 
 201. Id. at 481. 
32
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 5
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol33/iss3/5
2017] 9:00-5:00 FOR NINE MONTHS 803 
accommodations legislation ensures that women are not placed in 
this position. Further, pregnant employees would be guaranteed 
treatment equal to other temporarily disabled employees. Such 
accommodations are currently not guaranteed to pregnant women in 
Georgia and Georgia women demand and deserve equal employment 
options under the law. 
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